we left at these levers, after so much elimination? The leader, or the leading clique; and the knowledge that their background, their provenance, are immaterial. Soldiers, lawyers, or demagogues-they owe allegiance only to themselves. The important thing is that they rule; and that they do not rule to advance any interests, ultimately, but their own.
Though we cannot know their personality, and therefore predict their actions, we know one fact about the men who exercise power which gives us an insight into their likely principles of behaviour. We know the lowest common denominator or highest common factor of all rulers to be that power which is their end, and the reason of their being.
We know that in the achievement, the conservation, and the increase of power lies the essence of their work. Their aspirations to a power ever more secure, ever more absolute, mitigated only by their own will or irresolution, have turned everything to account. Religion, reform, national or class aspirations, are all pressed into service. The rulers themselves sometimes express the spirit of the age, at other times they accept the terms which that spirit imposed upon them. Sincerity, selfawareness, or shrewd hypocrisy, are all equally irrelevant in terms of their persistent quest.
Democracy has never hampered them: it merely calls for adjustment. The adjustment once made, the new form is found to serve the purposes of power sometimes even better than the old. As Roberto Michels explained a long time ago, the very fact that he is chosen by a democratic procedure provides the elected leader with better reason to consider himself the reflection of the collective will, hence to expect obedience to his personal will. He expects collective submission to the collective will which he is supposed to represent. Once upon a time it was a sin against the will of God to disobey the king. In a modem democracy, disobedience of the elected leader is a sin against oneself, and against that greater self which is one's will and that of others put "freely" into the leader's keeping. ' A series of great studies' has shown that the organization of modern political parties, even those bearing the most democratic labels, is far from democratic. And we know now that political parties are in effect oligarchic organizations, whose leadership falls to the most skilful and successfnl power-politician, and whose growing power tends to monopolize the political struggle in the society itself.
When, before the First World War, Michels was making his great study of "democratic" political parties, he conld still point to the electorate itself as offering a counterweight to the monolithic party machin-ery then in the making. He could suggest that the "elected" parliamentary politician is more independent than the "party" politician. The former, thought Michels, solicits an unorganized mass, easier to sway, more comfortable to handle, than the party organization with its dogma and its long memory. But now the elected politician and the party politician are one, and both labour under the same discipline and under the same restraints. The British election of 1945 "was not a candidates' election .... Electors voted not so much for the man as for the side." Five years later, "the 1950 election campaign . . . manifested, to a degree greater than ever before, the concentration of power in the hands of the central offices .... " So much so, that "the total absence of Independents made the Parliament of 1950 unique in its generation.'" The election and the Parliament of 1955 merely confirm (and, in the fate of Sir Richard Acland, emphasize) this point. In France, too, the new apparentement, or conjugation of electoral lists, has made it at least theoretically impossible for the independent candidate to secure election. In practice, of course, the would-be independent adopts a convenient label and tries to make a deal-not with the electorate, but with his fellow-politicians. As in the United States or Canada, the significant political decisions are not made at the polls, but beforehand in party caucus, in hotel bedrooms, in private or semi-private arrangements which the elector has only to ratify.-There are, of course, other organizations, other institutions, in a position to exert some influence on public opinion-schools, churches, trade unions. Wherever political power nears its ideal and political control is perfected, institutions such as these are supervised by the government. Wise statesmen have long considered education a branch of the civil service. In Soviet countries the church is muzzled, and the trade unions are a department of state. But even in the democracies such institutions have lost their power to rival the state, or to compete with it even merely for the public enr. I know no better recent discussion of this development than that of Bertrand de J ouvenel, in Du pouvoir.
Another important work, J. Goldstein's study of The Government of British Trade Unions, tells us how the unions, though neither muzzled nor nationalized, reproduce the democratic humbug and oligarchic conditions of political parties. The interesting thing to note about these circumstances is that nobody seems to mind, or even care. There is awareness up to a certain point, but no resentment. "Almost all inactive [union members] and ... even one third of the active members felt that they have never had any influence in a union decision or matter of policy," reports Mr. Goldstein II There is a well-known and pertinent story about a man who saws away the branch of the tree on which he sits. The story is so absurd that it is considered funny; but men in our time live a more absurd story still-a story in which millions are busily building walls about themselves, prison walls, barrack walls, concentration camp wails, all to imprison themselves in. Is the image so extreme when we know that thousands have dug their own graves, climbed down into them, and waited to be shot? What is extraordinary about people building their own concentration camps, when we know they are so docile about digging their own graves? What is extraordinary about 1984, when we know that half the world is living it in 1955?
The concentration camp is an isolation camp, systematically organized, cut off from the world, living its own life by its own rules. These rules are arbitrary and indeterminate, based on the -camp's peculiar nonns and, ultimately, on the will of its rulers. No outside standards are necessarily valid; if they appear, it is only by accidental and peculiar sanction. Since the will of the rulers may change as casually as may the rulers themselves, the canon of the camp resolves itself into power to inflict on one side, and will to survive on the other. Events appear uncontrollable, illogical, indeterminate. The arbitrary reigns: there is no rule of law, but rather of casual chance and of fancy which may determine life or death. Concentration camp economics appear opportunely as the epitome of that consumption economy which David Riesman tells us is the characteristic of contemporary society. They go to the very heart of things, by setting out to consume, not products, but the very essence of the products-time; and ultimately even human beings.
In the great concentration camp community, differences of degree, differences of intensity, only too often become blurred. Not all concentration camps are _ the same; none are perfect of their kind. But they resemble each other, their rulers resemble each other, their inmates resemble each other. For the rulers power, for the others survival, is the ultimately significant thing. And, where survival is the only end, to be alive in 1984 seems preferable to extinction in 1955. Surrender seems preferable to annihilation.
Surrender does not necessarily begin with ourselves. Most often it is others whom we consent to surrender in order to save ourselves, in order to buy time; and we go from surrender to surrender until everything and everyone we are allowed to sacrifice is gone, but our naked selves. The Jewish police force in the Warsaw Ghetto, the Death House cleaning squads at Auschwitz, carried this survivalism to its logical conclusion, without in the end managing to survive. If only we could save ourselves at the price of others! Harold Laski knew this: "An acceptance of injustice to others is the price we pay, and are prepared to pay, for our own safety.'" We accept the injustice "because it is none of our business," and John Donne is proved wrong by the practice of mankind, though he may be right in the poetic sense which Goethe tells us is the only form of truth. We accept the injustice because our neighbours do likewise, because it is at least tacitly endorsed by a public opinion which is a mass of jellified private opinions moved by discreditable emotions.
The brotherhood of man is a brotherhood of fear, a fraternity of conformity enforced by habit and by force. "La fraternite n'est que l'impossibilite de tuer son frere." So, on the one hand we have a surrender based on fear; on the other, the apathy, the indolence, the adjustability of man in the mass. Man's docility, his readiness to come to terms with a new reality which henceforth will be his norm, is an important characteristic. Some animals sicken and die outside their natural habitat. By that token, it is hard to assign a natural habitat to man: he lives as normally in the concentration camp as in the city. Only the norms are different.
Russian prisoners in Finland, sent to work almost freely in Finnish factories, complained of their humiliating lack of freedom . At home, they said, they owned and ran the factories in which they worked. Here they were serfs, their human dignity injured. Such a situation is the making of different norms, created by different conditions, and concealing different realities behind a similar vocabulary. As Bergson suggested, the word can be more powerful even than our own experience, apt to interpret or misinterpret it for us. 
"Il
There, in the first half of the nineteenth century, a French soldier gives us the pattern of the concentration camp state, the recipe for attaining the obvious end of all political striving: power, and power as absolute as possible. Is it a military camp or a concentration camp? The question is irrelevant. Jodl described Rastenburg, Hitler's East Prussian headquarters, as "a cross between a monastery and a concentration camp."12 In a state of siege (and the world is in one now), any camp is a prison, any ruler (though absolute) is prisoner in his own camp. In order to create the exact conditions he wants, he will use propaganda. In order to enforce them, he will use the military or police. In order to remain undisputed, he will stifle discussion at home and, where he cannot crush contradiction abroad, he will isolate the country from contaminating influences. What can be more isolated than a concentration camp, more a world in itself, more easily shaped to the norms most convenient to its mlers? But, though this may be possible in the imagination of Orwell, or in the peculiar circumstances of the Soviet Empire, it cannot happen, surely, where democratic institutions prevail? Slender hope! We have seen that democratic institutions are, in fact, oligarchic. The machinery of democratic politics is the machinery of oligarchic power. Organization, indispensable if some order is to prevail, means the syphoning of power into narrow, disciplined channels. "Qui dit organization, dit oligarchie."" From oligarchy to dictatorship is but a step. Indeed, the oligarch may well be a despot--even a dictator. Long ago Jefferson pointed out in his Notes on the State oj Virginia, that "173 despots would surely be as oppressive as one," and described the concentration of power which he saw taking place as an elective despotism. He may have exaggerated, but he foresaw the possibilities of the situation only too clearly. Within his own lifetime he was to see them realized in Bonaparte, whom Laboulaye has described as "democracy personified, the nation incarnated in a man."
There is no necessary contradiction between election and despotism, between democracy and autocracy. The Second Empire in France provides a case in point of such an apparent contradiction in terms; so does the Second German Reich-and even the Third, though this is more debatable. But the difference, the apparent contradiction, is a matter of words, of opportunities, and of impressions. The label of a leader or regime serves the same purpose of reassurance as the inscription Shower-Bath over the door of the Dachau death-chamber; but it means little. Just how little it means may be gleaned from Mr. Goldstein's account of how the dominant group of a branch of the Transport and General Workers' Union, Communist in 1947, had become Labour by 1948, not through a change of membership or heart but by the personal metamorphosis of Communist party members into Labour party members. 14 It is interesting to note that this change was not a result of pressure from the rank and file members. Are these Communists masquerading under an opportunistic label, or opportunists operating now under the Commnnist, now under the Labour label? Impossible to tell. Certainly, though, the label is irrelevant; only the will to power is relevant.
Issues can be as factitious as labels. This truth appears in Animal Farm and, more bitterly, in 1984. But even Orwell could not improve on the tragi-comedy of recent (and less recent) Communist politics, in which the loser becomes the scapegoat for his failures or another's. Neither issues nor labels, neither the success nor the failure of policies, really matter in this new universe where the only reality is power, and the preservation of power. To this end, a determined effort to suppress individuality supplements the natural apathy or indifference of the masses. To this end, disciplined other-directedness becomes the highest virtue, and conditions can be created almost at will to suit the needs of the moment. War scares, production drives, sympathy, or hatred, can be manipulated as necessary. And the essence of this activity is a continuous diminution of individuality, leading to a happy slave-mindedness. Ideally, the sheep which bleat "Four legs good, two legs bad" one day, must switch without a hitch in thought (in fact, without a thought) to "Four legs good, two legs better," whenever so required. And, maybe, back again.
There seems to be some evidence that we are moving towards such a halcyon state, that the concentration camp state is already here, forcing the appearance of a concentration camp world. The barbed wire faces both ways, and it is sometimes hard to tell who is fenced in, and who is fenced out.
Napoleon once said that you can do anything with bayonets except sit on them. We are engaged in proving him wrong to save our lives. We are .learning to sit on bayonets-an uncomfortable situation known as cold war. Yet the cold war could be more accurately described as perpetual war; or perpetual crisis and partial war, such as that which the Roman and the Parthian Empires kept up for so long. Only today perpetual crisis means a perpetual state of siege; an Etat de Siege a la Camus which can degenerate into the concentration camp world of 1984, and very naturally threatens to do so.
The world in which we live has suffered what somebody called a compound fracture of the illusions, and along with its illusions its selfconfidence has broken too. The crescendo of confidence in man which we can follow from the great days of the quattrocento bas burst in a series of apparently overwhelming failures. Men run to bide their fears in the lap of God, and the new favour which religion finds in the eyes of intellectuals is symptomatic of what many observers diagnose as loss of nerve. In the midst of despair, "the freedom of obedience" acquires real meaning and offers real relief from too much doubt and too many defeats. Belief and acceptance offer patent medicines for the soul: acceptance of formulas, acceptance of norms, acceptance of a state of things in which non-acceptance means sabotage; in which questioning, scepticism, criticism, mean sabotage; in which individuals assent to the suppression of the individual and of individuality because dissent "makes trouble," and conformity means relief from too-insoluble problems. They assent to their own suppression because it gives them the opportunity of melting away among a protective mass of indistinguishable fellow-blanks. '
This inclination must not be exaggerated, or unwisely attacked. Dissent carries its own dogma and its own hysteria; blatant nonconformity can be as offensive, as dangerous (and also as conformist in its own fashion) as blatant regimentation. But, though it would be foolish to exaggerate what are still no more than tendencies, it would be at least as foolish to underestimate their potential danger. The threat is there, if only in the bud, and the more terrible because it is so easy to succumb to it while trying to fight back. The tendency, natural enough, is to fight efficiency with counter-efficiency, organization with counterorganization, dogma with counter-dogma. To free the individual one calls for more disciplined subordination of the individual, and counterregimentation is necessary to fight the encroaching regimentation which we fear. "Positive" action of this sort, when carefully considered, invariably turns out to be essentially negative, leading us back once more into the maze from which we seek escape.
Should this hypothesis be correct, is there then no escape from the annihilation of the individual, from his disciplined confinement, or from the ruler's overweening power? Perhaps not. But if there be hope, it lies in that very instinct for self-preservation which makes men accept the concentration camp minimum for the sake of survival. The very selfishness which persuades us to sacrifice every non-essential in order that we may be preserved, may also persuade us to question the concepts, to brave the rules, to break the trammels, which irk us.
The concentration camp state, if based on anything but sheer necessity, can and will be challenged. Though it be armed with all the machinery of totalitarian control, it still needs its moral justification lest disillusion, drabness, and resentment clog the works. Yet all justifications, all formulas of the collective will, become irrelevant as soon as they come up against that ultimate reality: man's conception of his own convenience. Could salvation lie in a return to selfishness, to what used to be called enlightened self-interest, to a utilitarianism cleared of the rationalizations and the moral frills that weighed it down from birth?" Perhaps the pressure of moral and social forces that have been used to stifling ends would be eased by emancipation from moral and social thinking. Such self-assertion might allow the individual to recover his freedom of judgment, or at any rate of manoeuvre, to distinguish his own interests and try to follow them selfishly and sanely.
The freedom of the individual does not lie in non-existent "natural laws," or in artificial constitutional principles. Helvetius told us once upon a time that principles and laws only have meaning in relation to social utility. We should have been warned that social utility has nothing in common with private utility except by chance; that it has its impersonal implications and necessities, without solicitude or scruple for the individual. We paid no heed. Perhaps we thought no one would read Helvetius. Yet, though only a few did, his thought was obvious, and his concept holds good in democracy or concentration camp. There is no protection to be found in inevitably social-minded codes. There is no freedom to be found under the law, except the freedom of obediencea nonsense that men too seldom challenge. There is no freedom in obedience: there must be constraint in conformity.
Montesquieu once argued that men do not conform because they are free. He held that freedom is the power not to conform to laws, and rules, and accepted standards: "La liberte est en nous une imperfection: nous sommes libres et incertains, parce que nOllS ne sayans pas certainement ce qui nous est Ie plus convenable." This is the terror of today; and it is from this that the concentration camp offers its factitious escape into conformity with a General Will to which we surrender our incertitude-and also our freedom. But should we want to escape from the totalitarian rule of the General Will, this "imperfection" is our greatest hope. Bertrand Russell, after all, attributes the greatuess of the Greeks in individual achievement to their political incompetence." The connection is justifiable.
Ultimately, the freedom of the individual lies in his natural and inescapable selfishness. Hobbes, who recognized this, tried to base a theory of state upon it. It does not seem that any practical political structure (whatever its label, or theoretical justification) has been able to ignore the reality which he presented.
But while selfishness, as Hobbes reminds us, can lead to a social contract (and eventually to social bondage), it can also lead to breaking it. Faced with the unpleasant results of his social and principal activities, man can take refuge in opportunism. With the gap between rulers and ruled becoming greater, with the discrepancy between word and fact becoming greater, only the will to disregard all rules in a policy of selfish opportunism can save the individual. IT At the moment, the individual struggles to preserve his freedom by trying to group and organize against encroaching powers. But counterorganization cannot destroy the concentration camp: it can only build new ones. In the struggle between organizations, the most highly organized must win. The concentration camp is the essence and the quintessence of organization. Only disorganization, disunity, the denial of collective reality, can harm it and offer hope of its destruction.
